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I. INTRODUCTION 
The straightforward question facing this Court is whether the Madison County Board of 
County Commissioners (the "County'' or "Commission") issued a clearly erroneous and 
fundamentally unfair results-oriented land use decision against Bums Holdings, LLC ("Burns"). The 
Commission made its contested decision even though the Madison County Planning and Zoning 
Commission favorably recommended the proposed change with a 6-1 vote. 
Even more remarkable, the Commission denied Burns' proposed change at the same time it 
unanimously approved a similar proposed land use change for Walters Iieady Mix, Inc. ("Walters"), 
the only company with a concrete facility already in Madison County. Burns is the only direct 
competition to Walters in the Upper Snake River Valley. During the hearing process before the 
Commission, it became very clear to Burns that a majority of the Commission was biased against 
Burns in an effort to protect Walters. Accordingly, counsel for Bums specifically requested that the 
entire Walters record be made part of the Burns record in the event the Commission's decision 
relative to Burns was appealed. The records of the two concurrent applications establishes the 
Commission's decision against Burns to have apparently been predetermined in order to protect 
Walters, an established Madison County business, and not based upon the merits of the application. 
This type of decision-making violates Idaho law and notions of fundamental fairness. 
In appealing to this Court, Burns recognizes that"a strong presumption of validity favors an 
agency's actions,"' including "the zoning body's application and interpretation of its own zoning 
1 Young Electric Sign Co. v. Slale, 135 Idaho 804, 25 P.3d 117 (2001); See also Cooper v. Bd ofprof? Discipline, 
134 Idaho 449,454, 4 P.3d 561, 566 (2000). 
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 ordinance^."^ Nevertheless, this presumption can be overcome, and this case presents a unique 
instance where the record demonstrates the Commission's results-oriented motives. Despite the 
identical nature of the Burns and Walters applications, which were submitted and decided at the 
same time, the Commission issued opposite decisions, with the Walters application being approved 
with a unanimous 3-0 vote and the Bums application being denied by a 2-1 vote. 
Given the timing and similarity of these two applications, there is no legitimate distinction 
between the Burns and Walters applications to justify such disparate treatment. With both records 
before this Court for review. it can be shown that the Burns decision was results-oriented and 
violative of Idaho law. 
PI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case arises under the Local Land Use Planning Act (the "LLUPA") and the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act as ajudicial review of the action of Madison County in denying the 
issuance of acomprehensiveplan amendment and concurrent zone change requested by Burns. This 
denial was made despite (i) proposals made by Bums to answer safety concerns from a previous 
appearance before the Commission, (ii) Burns' amendments to its applications to provide for only 
12 acres of light industrial zoned land embedded within 37 acres of commercial zoned land as 
previously recommended by the Madison County Planning and Zoning Commission [hereinafter 
"Planning and Zoning"], (iii) a favorable detailed study from a nationally known safety expert, (iv) 
approval from the Idaho Transportatioil Department, (v) the project's location near the North 
2 Crown Poinl Developmenl. Inc. v. City ofsun Valley, 144 Idaho 72,- 156 P.3d 573, 576 (2007). 
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Rexburg Interchange of Highway 20, (vi) Bums' purchase of additional property in order to improve 
the access to the Burns parcel, (vii) the absence of any structures bordering the property, (viii) the 
fact that the property is bordered by waste ground, sub-ground, pasture, a gravel pit, two small 
farmed pieces, Highway 20, and the Salem Highway, and (ix) a 6-1 favorable recommendation from 
Planning and Zoning recommending amendment to the comprehensive plan and further 
recommending a related concurrent zone change. 
Burns seeks an order providing that the County's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an 
abuse of discretion, and not based on substantial evidence, thereby reversing the Commission's 
decision in this matter. 
B. Course of the Proceedings Below. 
(I)  Round One. 
The Burns property is a 49-acre parcel located at the northwestern section of the North 
Rexburg Interchange on Highway 20 (hereinafier, "North Interchange") in Madison County, Idaho.) 
Directly southwest of the Burns parcel is a gravel pit known as the Cornelisen gravel pit: which the 
County considers to be an industrial use.' In 1979,46.8 of the 49 acres were purchased by Robert 
3 See, e.g., R. Exhibits 8-9, R. Exhibit 12, Tab 1, Photo 2. Copies of all three photographs are attached to this brief 
for ease of reference as Appendices A, B, and C, respectively. 
4 R. Vol. 4 Bums 7 at 4; See also Appendices A through C attached hereto. 
5 R. Exhibit, Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw and Decision of the Board ofCounty Comntissioners of 
Madison County, Idaho, RE: Comprehensive Plarz Zone Change to Add a Commercial and a Light Industrial Zone Near State 
Highway 191, at 13-14 (This letter is part of the material that is the subject of the Motion to Augment the Record filed on 
Novelnber 29, 2007. It is hund in the folder entitled "Augmented Record Volume 2" at Tab 4). In this decision involving 
Walters, the County concluded that agravcl pit neighboring the Walters site was an industrial use. 
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and Gayle Taylor from Bruce S h i r l e ~ . ~  The remaining approximate two-acre portion of the 49-acre 
piece was retained by Mr. Shirley. 
In 2003, Mrs. Taylor, now widowed, submitted applications to amend the compreheitsive 
plan and to request a zone change from Transitional Agriculture-2 (trans-ag 2) to industrial for her 
46.8-acre parcel. Mrs. Taylor made the request while she still owned the property in order to sell the 
parcel to Burns for its use in order to construct an enclosed concrete batch plant. It was necessary 
to make such a request because there was no other industrially-zoned land in Madison C o ~ n t y . ~  
Planning and Zoning Commission favorably recommended tlie requested change to the 
comprehensive plan and the zone change requested by Mrs. Taylor with a 4-3 vote.' Planning and 
Zoning relied upon the testimony of traffic experts to conclude that the access to the Burns parcel 
and the North Interchange itself were safe.9 
Despite the favorable recommendations, on February 17,2004, the Commission issued its 
oral decision denying Ms. Taylor's requested changes. The written decision on this matter was not 
issued until October 20,2004, over eight months after the oral decision was rendered." 
6 R. Vol. 4 Burns 4 at I 
7 R. Val. 4 Burns 8 at p. 11, LL. 10 through p. 13, LL. 2; See also R. Exhibit, Public Hearing, RE Burns Holdings, 
LLC, Requestfor Zone Change, at p. 35  LL. 3-4 (Commissioner Passey testimony that Madison County "[does not] have enough 
industrial zoning available, . . ."). 
8 R. Vol. 4 Burns 4 at 7,9. 
9 R. Vol. 4 Burns 6.  
10 R. Voi. 4 Burns 7 at 29. 
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(2) Round Two. 
(a) Commission Decision. 
Between the time the Commission issued its oral decision on Mrs. Taylor's application and 
subsequent written decision, Bums acquired Mrs. Taylor's property and the lleighboring two-acre 
parcel formerly owned by Bruce Shirley. ' I  Acting in accordance with County suggestions given after 
the Taylor application was denied, Bums requested azone change for the property from Transitional- 
Ag 2 to a combined industrial/commercia1 parcel of 12 acres of light industrial zoned land to 
construct a concrete batch plant, which was buffered by 37 acres of commercial property. Burns 
filed its application for zone change onNovember 22, 2004." The County treated the zone change 
application as both an application for a zone change and as an application for amendment to the 
comprehensive plan. 
After Burns submitted its requested zone change to include a commercial buffer, Walters 
amended its pending application before the County to include a commercial buffer of its own.') The 
only material difference between the two applications was that the commercial buffer would 
surround a gravel pit on Walter's property, instead of a concrete batch plant as proposed by Bums. 
Both the Burns application and the Walters application were reviewed and decided at the same time 
by the County. 
1 I R. Exhibit 11  at Tab 3. Burns acquired the propetly from a land developer who had previously purchased the two- 
acre parcel from Mr. Bruce Shirley. 
12 R. Burns 12. 
13 R. Vol. 4 Walters 5. 
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After reviewing the Burns application, it was recommended for approval by Planning and 
Zoning with a 6-1 vote.14 The only vote for nonapproval was made by Millie Andrus, the wife and 
mother of two members of the law firm representing Walters." 
A public hearing before the Commission on both the Burns and Walters applications was 
held on February 28,2005, with Walters' hearing occurring first and Bums' following immediately 
thereafter. The Walters application was approved with a 3-0 vote of the Cominis~ion.~~ The Burns 
application was denied by a 2-1 vote." 
(b) First Petition for Judicial Review. 
After the Commission's decision, Bums filed its first petition for judicial review, which 
alleged unlawful reasoning and decision-making on issues of traffic and safety. Burns also 
challenged the participation of Commissioner Brooke Passey, who had economic ties to Walters.18 
On the day of the hearing for the first petition for judicial review, before the scheduled 
hearing was to take place, District Judge Brent Moss requested that both parties and their counsel 
meet with him in chambers where he expressed his decision to remand the matter back to the 
Commission because of his concerns for the two major issues raised by Burns. 
14 R. Voi. 4 Bums 17; R. Vol. 4 Burns 22. 
15 Tlie law firm representing Walters was Rigby, Thatcher, Andrus, Rigby, and Moeller, Chtd. Ms. Andrus's 
husband, Rich, and her son, Reed, are both members of the firm. The question of whether Ms. Andrus had a conflict as to the 
Waiters decision was addressed in a letter from then-County attorney Penny Stanford. See R. Vol. 4 Walters 7. Ms. Andrus was 
excused from voting in the planning and zo~iing meeting because of this cof~fiict (see R. Vol. 4 Burns 21 at 8), but she did not 
exclude herself from voting in the Burns matter. See R. Vol. 4 Burns 21 at 7. 
16 R. Vol. 4 Waiters 12. 
17 R. Vol  4 Burns 78 at 4 ~ ~~ ~ . . ... -.
I8 5ct. I< f:~hibil Lettt~r/r,>nr /'et!?zj % I ( ~ I I J O ~ ~  10 R ~ g e r  \ l~ . t r ,  RE C ' ~ ~ / l t ; r  c / / . I I c ~ ~ ~ ~ I ,  h1:ar:h 23. 2 L O j  (1111s le~ler 3 s  
~ n n  uftlie i o ~ r ~ r ~ n l  rI1;11 is llie suhiccr oirlie \lollon ru ..2uunic11t the llccurd f i l ~ l  O I I  So!r'illhcr 29. 2007 lr i \  iound in rhc iilidcr - 
entitled "Augmented Record ~ o l i r n e  2" at Tab 3). 
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As to Judge Moss's concern with traffic and safety, the Judge seemed to be most concerned 
with a substantial error made by the Commission in its analysis of traffic and safety, and the 
County's reliance on a traffic count-not a traffic study-performed by the County's employee, Dusty 
Cureton. The main basis for the denial of the Burns application was traffic and safety, and the errors 
in the Commission's traffic analysis concerned the court most. 
The substantial error on traffic and safety related to the misreading and lnisullderstanding of 
part of an expert report from Mr. James Pline, an expert hired by Bums to analyze traffic and safety 
issues at the North Inter~hange.'~ Because of this error, the Commission went on to erroneously 
discredit Mr. Pline's analysis and the numbers he used in his analysis, which he had obtained from 
the Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD"). 
After discrediting Mr. Pline's report, the County had relied upon their own traffic count 
perfonned by Dusty Cureton, which actually produced numbers similar-but even less than-the 
numbers produced by Mr. Pline, as shown by the following chart:" 
I9 'Tl~is enor cdn bcst hc opla~ncd  I)) rhaitllnlni. I:lgurc I cjt'3lr. l'l111C"s Irdili. An3I)sis I'OL~.! at I< L'~hlb11 2, l ab  
3 D 6 7111s Frg~ri.  ionialnj trafii \v!rim: nunibsr.c ohlninr.l f r i i !~ 1111. 1 l'il ior 20112 ;uxi prorertcd traffic \oiulnr> fur 2u2i 711; - . " 
Commission apparently viewed the information contained in the lower right hand corner as being an average of the ITD traffic 
volume numbers for each road stretch around the Highway 20 Interchange. However, the information in the lower right hand 
corner of Figure 1 is illustrative only, wherein Mr. Pline attempted to demonstrate that the 2002 figures from the ITD were 
written on Figure 1 without parentheses and that the projected traffic volume for 2025 was written within parentheses. The 
actual traffic volume numbers for each stretch of road are written up next to the individual stretches. For example, for the road 
stretch north of the North Interchange odoffra~nps, the traffic volume for 2002 was 4,190 (the number not in parentheses) and 
the projected number for 2025 is 13,000 (number is in parentheses). 
20 R. Exhibit Public Nearing Transcript, RE Burns Holdings, LLC Request for Comprehensive Plan Change, 
February 28, 2005, at p. 88 LL. 20 through p. 90 LL. 17. (This transcript is part of the material that is the subject of the Motion 
to Augment the Record filed on Nove~uber 29,2007). 
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The Commission thereafter used Mr. Cureton's numbers incorrectly in performing traffic volume 
Road section 
North of the North Interchange (both directions) 
South of the North Interchange (both directions) 
Between the north and south onloff ramps at the North 
Interchange (both directions) 
projections, all ofwhich were contrary to ITD projected numbers, and determined that Mr. Cureton's 
current traffic numbers were "23% higher than the figure forecasted for the year 2025F2' which led 
Mr. Pline's Figures 





to the following clearly erroneous conclusion: 
Mr. Cureton's Figures 





Where the Salem Highway is already receiving such a large volume of traffic, already 
exceeding the state's predictions for that roadway for the year 2025, the added 
pressure of the highway of numerous heavy vehicles such as the applicant proposes 
is manifestly unsafe.22 
Obviously, however, the Salem Highway was not then exceeding the state's predictions for traffic 
volume on the highway in 2025, some 20 years in the future. 
The participation of Commissioner Passey likewise concerned Judge Moss. Commissioner 
Passey had performed painting work for Waitersz3 and Judge Moss was concerned that 
Commissioner Passey's participation with the Burns proposal could be compromised because of the 
competition Burns posed to Walters. Because, however, Judge Moss was aware that Commissio~ler 
Passey had resigned from the Commission a few months previous to the meeting in Judge Moss's 
21 R. Vol. 4 Burns 29 at 28. 
22 Id at 30. 
23 See R. Exhibit Leller/rom Penny Stanford to Roger Mr. RE: Conflicl ofInleres1, March 23,2005, at I (This 
letter is part of thc material that is the subject of the Motion to Augment the Record filed on November 29,2007. It is found in 
the folder entitled "Augmented Record Volume 2" at Tab 3). 
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chambers, he concluded that a remand to the Commission without Commissioner Passey would 
resolve any conflict issues that may have been present during the Commission's first hearing. 
In chambers, Judge Moss informed the parties that he would remand the case back to the 
Commission to fix the alleged deficiencies he identified. Judge Moss suggested that Burns could 
go ahead with oral argument, but he also indicated it would not be time well spent to argue the issue 
because he had already made his decision. Both parties stipulated to the reinand.z4 
(3) Round Three. 
(a) Commission Decision 
On remand, the Commission held a work meeting on April 13,2006, where it not only again 
reviewed the traffic and safety issues that were the basis for the remand, but in addition, reviewed 
all other issues relative to the project outlined in Madison County's Comprehensive Plan. After a 
discussion of these newly conceived concerns, and without the submission or hearing of any new 
evidence, the Commission once again denied Burns' application on June 1, 2006. 
Incredibly, even after having had the opportunity to correctly review Pline's traffic report, 
the Commission once again concluded that the North Interchange was unsafe without explaining why 
the Commission did not believe the information contained in Pline's report, the Keller Report, the 
traffic counts provided by ITD, and the County's own records. The Commission also introduced a 
number of new claims relative to this issue, including aclaim that the interchange design was unsafe, 
an issue that had not be raised previously by the Commission and not addressed with an expert report 
of any kind. Burns' only recourse was to file a second petition for judicial review. 
24 R. Vol. 1 at 331-32. 
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(b) Second Petition for Judicial Review and District Court Decision 
The second petition for judicial review was similar to the first, except for the conflict issue 
raised in the first petition for judicial review. After a hearing on the second petition for judicial 
review, the district court issued a written decision on October 17,2006 upholding the Commission's 
decision to deny the Burns application. The district court essentially concluded that the lodestar 
factor of any land use decision in Madison County is not the standards applied in reaching a land use 
decision, but the location of the property, a characteristic no two properties can share. 
Nevertheless, the district court determined that Burns was entitled to a partial award of 
attorney's fees because "of the Board's obvious misinterpretation of evidence in the record . . . and 
apossible conflict of interest issue that one of the Board members may have had."z5 As a result, the 
district court awarded fees incurred by Burns up to and including March 13,2006 because of the 
"unique procedural facts of this case."26 
Shortly after the decision on attorney's fees, the County filed a motion for reconsideration 
requesting the district court to reverse its decision on attorney's fees. The district court obliged, and 
reversed its earlier decision awarding Burns its attorney's fees. 
111. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was the Commission's decision on the Burns application results-oriented in light of the 
Commission's decision on the Walters, which was decided at the same time? 
2. Should the decision in Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 
50 P.3d 443 (2002) be extended to require that oral testimony of lay witnesses in opposition 
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to official and expert reports be supported by other credible evidence before such lay 
testimony can be adopted? 
3. Was the Commission's decision arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole? 
4. Has a substantial right of Bums been prejudiced? 
5. Is Bums entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal to the district court pursuant to 
Idaho Code 5 12- 1 17, andlor an award of attorney's fees on appeal to this court? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Judicial Review. 
The LLUPA stresses fundamental fairness in land use decision-making: 
It is the intent of the legislature that decisions made pursuant to [the LLUPA] should 
be founded upon sound reason and practical application of recognized principles of 
law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts of the state are directed to consider the 
proceedings as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant 
decisions in light of practical considerations with an emphasis on fundamental 
fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making." 
The LLUPA "allows an affected person to seek judicial review of an approval or denial of 
a land use application, as provided for in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act ("IDAPA").28 
When judicial review of LLUPA decisions is undertaken, "a local agency making a land use 
decision, such as the Board of Commissioners, is treated as a government agency under IDAPA."29 
Judicial review is a two-step process, wherein "[tJhe party appealing the Board of 
Commissioners' decision must first show the Board of Commissioners erred in a manner specified 
27 IDAHOCODE $67-6535(c) (emphasis added). 
28 CrownPoint Development, Inc. v. Cify ofsun Valley, 144 Idaho 72,- 156 P.3d 573,575 (2007). 
29 Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,74,73 P.3d 84,87 (2003). 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 11 
under LC. 3 67-5279(3), and second, that a substantial right has been prej~diced."~' If both are 
demonstrated, then this court may "reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the 
appellant have beenprejudiced."'' When there is asubsequent appeal from adistrict court's decision 
to the Idaho Supreme Court where the district court was acting in an appellate capacity under 
IDAPA, "the Supreme Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's 
de~ision."'~ 
In reviewing an agency decision, the reviewing court will determine if ihe agency decision 
is supported by substantial evidence. In reviewing decisions in which an agency differed from an 
administrative law judge, the agency is obligated to explain why the agency differed from the 
administrative law judge.)' The same principle should apply in a land use proceeding because a 
land-use decision is reviewed with the same standard of review of an administrative decision. When 
a commission's decision is different from the recommendation of the planning and zoning board, 
the commission is obligated to explain why the it differed from the planning and zoning decision.j4 
For the reasons set forth below, the County's decision on the Burns application was neither 
reasonable nor lawful, and should therefore be reversed. 
30 Id at 75-76,73 P.3d at 74-75; See also IDAHO CODE $ 67-5279(4). 
31 NomesteadFarms, Inc. v. Boardof Commissioners of Teton County, 141 ldaho 855, 858, 119 P.3d 630, 633 
(2005). 
32 Crown Point Development, 144 Idaho at - 156 P.3d at 576. 
33 As stated in the case ofPearl v. Board ofProfessiona1 Discipline, 137 ldaho 107, 112, 44 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2002): 
"Where the agency's findings disagree with those of the hearing panel, this Court will scrutinize the agency's findings more 
critically. Woodfeldv. Board of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho 738, 746, 905 P.2d 1047, 1053 (Ct.App.1995). As the Court 
of Appeals noled in Woodfield, there is authority for courts to impose on the agency an obligation of reasoned decision making 
that includes a duty to explain why the agency differed fiom the administrative law judge. Woodfield, 127 Idaho at 746, 747 n. 3, 
905 P2d  at 1053 n. 3." 
34 See Davisco Foods Int 1 Inc. v Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784,794-95, 118 P.3d 116, 126-27 (2005) (Jones, J., 
dissenting). 
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B. Arbitrary and Capricious Standard. 
The arbitrary and capricious standard applies to the exercise of discretion undertaken by the 
Commission. Generally, decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals 
have quoted the standards articulated in Idaho Code $ 67-5279(3) without offering further 
explanation of this standard, which appears to be a "know-it-when-we-see-it" type approach when 
reviewing alleged arbitrary and capricious actions. 
This lack of clarity was noted by the district court: "'arbitrary and capricious' is 'OR used but 
infrequently defined by the courts. This is largely because the term and its application do not need 
explanation beyond its definiti~n.'"~' In essence, "arbitrary" actions are "founded on prejudice or 
preference rather than reason or fact", and "capricious" actions are "characterized by or guided by 
unpredictable or impulsive behavior" or are "contrary to the evidence or established rules of law." 
In reviewing alleged arbitrary and capricious actions, "the focus of this inquiry is on the methods by 
which the agency arrived at its decision . . . ."36 
For the reasons set forth below, the County's decision and treatment of Burns' application 
was arbitrary and capricious, and should therefore be reversed. 
C. Substantial Evidence Standard. 
The substantial evidence standard applies when a court reviews an agency's fact-finding. 
A court "defers to the Board of Comn~issioners' findings of fact unless the findings of fact are clearly 
2 5  R Vol l at 1 S 
. ~ , . ., - 
Auto. Im. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Parkv Volpe, 401 U.S. 402<1971)). 
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erroneous. The Board of Commissioners' factual findings are not clearly erroneous so long as they 
are supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting evidence."j7 Put another way, "the 
standard requires the reviewing court to consider all of the record and to determine on the basis of 
that record whether the agency's factfinding was reas~nable."~~ 
As set forth below, the Commission's fact-finding was not reasonable and was not supported 
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Commission's Decision on the Burns Application Was Results-Oriented, as 
Established by the Commission's Decision on the Walters Application. 
The Burns and Walters applications were virtually identical, except that Walters proposed 
a gravel pit to be located upon its light industrial property, while Bums instead proposed an enclosed 
pollution-free concrete batch facility.39 Both Burns and Walters made their proposals because there 
was no zoned industrial property in Madison County, except for a small parcel located within the 
City of Re~burg.~ '  
Nevertheless, despite the similar nature of the Burns and Walters applications, which were 
submitted and decided at the exact same time, the Commission issued polar opposite decisions, with 
the Walters application being approved by a unanimous 3-0 vote and the Burns application being 
denied by a 2-1 vote. This case thus presents this court with the opportunity to provide much needed 
direction on the arbitrary and capricious standard described in IDAPA. 
37 Evans v. Teton Counly, 139 Idaho 71,75,73 P.3d 84,88 (2003). 
38 Gilmore & Goble, 30 IDAHOL. REV. at 363. 
39 A rendering of the proposed facility is found at R. Exhibit 1 1 at Tab 1 
40 R. Vol. 4 Burns 8 at p, 62 LL. 1-6. 
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The Burns proposal sought the rezone of 49 acres of land located on the northwest comer of 
the North Interchange of Highway 20. The proposal sought a 12-acre light industrial parcel to be 
surrounded by 37 acres of commercial property!' The land is marginal farm ground that was 
bisected when Highway 20 was constructed in the late 1970s. The landowner at the time was 
compensated not only for the property purchased by the State of Idaho to build Highway 20, but was 
also compensated for the resulting odd shaped bisected parcels of property that re~ulted.4~ The only 
two homes adjacent to the Burns site is located on the same property across Salem Road on the 
northeast comer of the North Interchange:' 
The Walters proposal sought to rezone 130 acres44 of farmland located in southern Madison 
County in order to mine gravel from the site. The gravel pit site was proposed to be approximately 
80 acres, with an approximate 50-acre commercial and trans-ag 2 buffer!' The property is not near 
any major interchange, and is several miles from a proposed (but presently nonexisting) interchange 
near Thornton. The Walters property is a large tract of land, is surrounded by other large tracts of 
farmland, and is bordered by the road 4700 South, which has a residential subdivision located on its 
south side. Incidentally, the Walters proposal would not eventually provide an illcrease in industrial 
land available for future industrial uses because the end result will be a mined gravel site. 
41 R. Burns 12. 
42 R. Exhibit 12 at Tab 2 p. 2-3. 
43 See Appendices A, B, and C, anached hereto. 
44 For some reason, there was contradictory testimony as to the exact acreage irivolved with the Walters parcel. The 
application stated that it involved development of 119.6 acres. R. Val. 4 Walters 1. However, Walters later stated that the parcel 
was approximately 131 acres. R. Exhibit Public Hearing RE: Walter's Concrete Comprehensive Plan Change, February 28, 
2005, at p. 12, LL. 20-25 (This transcript is part of the material that is the subject of the Motion to Augment the Record filed on 
November 29,2007). 
45 R. Exhibit Public Hearing RE: Walter's Concrete Comprehensive Plan Change, February 28, 2005, at p. 13, LL. 4- 
8. 
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The record on appeal, which contains both the Burns and Walters records, is voluminous. 
It is nevertheless crucial to review the actual language from the record in reviewing the 
Commission's actions. To assist this court in seeing how differently Burns and Walters were treated, 
we have prepared the following table comparing the Commission's actions on a number of issues 
relative to each application. Exhibit D contains a much more detailed version of these tables, 
complete with quotations from the record and citations to these quotes. We strongly encourage this 
court to review the actual language from the record contained in Exhibit D to get a flavor for how 
the Commission analyzed each application. For the court's convenience and for brevity, however, 
we have provided the following summary tables: 
TABLE I. 
ISSUE 
I APPLICATIONS I 
I BURNS I WALTERS I 
I I Both Burns and Walters applied for amendments to I 
APPLICATION DESCRIPTION 
No. 
the coniprehensive plan and zoning ordinance, to 
rezone agricultural or transitional agricultural property 
to a mix of light industrial a ~ d  commercial. 
W A S  A TRAFFIC STUDY REQUESTED 
BY AND SUBMITTED TO THE 
~ O M M I S S i O N ?  
Yes. 
CONCERNS VOICED BY RESIDENTS 
ABOUT TRAFFIC AND SAFETY? 
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EXISTING INTERCHANGE ON 




AGREED TO PROVIDE AND PAY FOR Yes. 
INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS? 
INGRESS AND EGRESS PECIFIED 
ANDPLANNEDFOR? 
I COMMERCIAL BUFFER DESIGN Yes. SUGGESTED TO APPLICANT BY THE 
I 
APPLICATIONS 
QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF FARM 






49 acres of poor farm 
ground due to the soil 
quality, shape, low spots, 
s u b w a t  e r , a n d 
configuration problems 
because of Highway 20. 
Over 130 acres of farm 
ground that is bordered by 
other large tracts of farm 
ground. 
ISSUE 
LOCATION OF RESIDENCES NEXT 
TO HIGHWAYS IN THE COUNTY 
COMMISSION ANAEUSIS 
TRUCK TRAFFIC AND THE 
POTENTIAL FOR ACCIDENTS. 
Not significant 
BURNS 
A Policy of Madison 
County, 
Significant. 
POTENTIAL FUTURE TRAFFIC. 
POTENTIAL FUTURE COMMERCIAL 
TRAFFIC. 
Not considered. 
No traffic study on any 
traffic issue was submitted 
by Walters or considered. 
WALTERS 
Not a policy of Madison 
County. 
Considered. 
The Commission used 
this as a basis for 
denying the Burns 
application. 
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BURNS I WALTERS ISSUE 
EFFECT OF AMENDMENT ON THE 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 
DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL 
PROPERTY NEXT TO AN INDUSTRIAL 
SITE DETERMINED TO BE 
SPECULATIVE. 
PLACEMENT OF DIFFERING LAND 




Considered and used as a 
basis for denying the 
Burns application. 










IS  THE APPLICANT'S PROPERTY 
CONTIGUOUS WITH THE REXBURG 
CITY IMPACT ZONE? 
Yes. 
Negative. Not negative. 
I 
Dramat ic  nega t ive  Minimalimpactonproperty 
impact on property values. 
values. 
I ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Primary beneficiary is Primary beneficiary is Burns. Madison County. 
No. Not considered. 
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SPOT ZONING Considered a "spot 
zone". 
Not considered. 
In deciding as it has, the Commission has never articulated in its written decisions or its 
briefing on appeal to the district court why the standards applied to Burns were so patently different 
from those applied to Walters. The simultaneous application of differing standards on substantially 
identical issues is arbitrary and capricious, and the foregoing tables demonstrate the arbitrary and 
capricious nature of the Commission's decision-making. Moreover, because of these differing 
standards, it is not possible for the County to articulate its desired standard on any one issue. The 
Commission's decision-making is fundamentally unfair and should not be allowed under the 
LLUPA. The County's standards should be substantially the sanle for all properties and be applied 
consistently, and demonstrably disparate treatment should be held to be entirely unlawful. For these 
reasons, the Commission's decision must be reversed. 
B. Evans v. Boardof Commissioners of Cassia County Should Be Extended to Require That 
Oral Testimony of Lay Witnesses in Opposition to Official and Expert Reports to be 
Supported by Credible Evidence Before Such Lay Testimony Is Adopted. 
A common thread running throughout the County's decision on nearly every issue involved 
was the County's reliance onanecdotal evidence-oral claims and testimony only-without supporting 
empirical evidence, even when such claims and testimony were directly contrary to empirical 
evidence presented to the Commission. Concerned citizens and county commissioners participating 
in land use hearings should not be able to prevail by simply making assertions contrary to official 
reports and expert opinions without meaningful evidence to support those claims. Otherwise, there 
can be no meaningful limitation on the ability of elected officials to make land use decisions based 
on mere whim and emotion, rather than evidence and logic. 
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In making this argument, Burns recognizes that strict evidentiary rules should not be enforced 
in a land use hearing or the Idaho Rules of Evidence be applied. Indeed, in Evans v. Board of 
Commissioners of Cassia County, this court rightly held that it "would not be feasible to require 
those conducting [a local land use hearing], who frequently are not trained in the law, to accept only 
that evidence which would be admissible in a court pr~ceeding.""~ 
Nevertheless, it is significant to note the Evans courts' subsequent language that, while strict 
rules of evidence should not apply, evidentiary principles of credibility, trustworthiness and 
reliability still have their place in land use hearings. Thus, as noted by the Evans court, the evidence 
must be presented "in a format in which the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence could be 
assessed firsthaiid."" This court stated that this was accolnplished in Evans through the submissioli 
of both oral testimony and twenty-five exhibits supportiiig and bolstering the oral testimony.48 
local residents' testimony even though the testi~nony was contrary to both official reports and expert 
reports and testimony. Such whole-hearted reliance on unsupported testimony, without any 
explanation of why the Commission disregarded the official and expert reports and the 
recommendation of its own planning and zoning commission, does not inspire confidence in the this 
process. 
Put another way, without supporting evidence for the Colnmission to gauge the credibility 
of the oral representations made by local residents, the Commission's reliance on such statements 
4 6  Evans v Board of Comm 'rs of Cassia Counly, 137 Idaho 428,432,50 P.3d 443,447 (2002) 
47 id. 
48 137 Idaho 428,432,50 P.3d 443,447 (2002). 
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in its decision results in a decision that is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole, and therefore violates Idaho Code 9 67-6735(c). Specific instances where the Commission 
made this crucial error will be discussed in more detail below. The issue is raised and discussed 
here, however, because it is a common critical issue throughout the remaining sections, which 
discuss specific topics analyzed by the Commission 
C. The County's Determinations on the Issues Set Forth Below Were Arbitrary and 
Capricious and Not Supported by Substantial Evidence on the Record as a Whole. 
(I) Transportation, Traffic, andSafety at theNorth Interchange ojWghway20cendSalem 
Road. 
(a) Introduction. 
Both Burns and the County would surely agree that the major issue regarding the Burns 
application was traffic and safety. As noted by the district court, "[bloth parties have spent 
considerable time, energy and money analyzing the transportation ~omponent ."~~ Burns presented 
expert evidence from a number of sources concluding that the North Interchange was safe. 
Opponents of Burns presented only oral testimony that the interchaxge was unsafe as to both traffic 
and interchange design because of numerous alleged accidents that had taken place in the past. 
The access to Burns' proposed site on the northwest side of the Highway 20 interchange is 
proposed to connect with Salem Highway approximately 822 feet from the center of the North 
In ter~hange.~~ The 65-foot access to the Burns parcel was originally installed by ITD when theNorth 
Interchange was constructed, and is the only access to the property." The access was not proposed 
49 R. Vol. 3 at 498. 
50 R. Exhibit 12 Tab 3 at *2 (James L. Pline, Traffic Analysis, BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, Salem Road, North of US 
20 interchange, December 9, 2004). 
51 Burns 8 at p. 20 LL5-7 (Testimony of ITD District Engineer Tom Cole); See also R. Exhibit Public Hearing 
Transcript, RE Burns I-loldings, LLC Requestfor Comprehensive Plan Change, February 28,2005, at p. 6 LL. 3-5. 
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nor constructed by Burns, rather, it was a preexisting access constructed in the late 1970s by ITD. 
The Burns access is across Salem Road from an already-existing driveway to two residential homes 
located on the same property across from the Bums site, the only homes adjacent to the Burns site 
which are also adjacent to the west-bound off ramp of Highway 20.52 111 earlier land use hearings 
involving Mrs. Gayle Taylor, the County made suggestions relative to her proposal. After Burns 
purchased the property, and instead of challenging the Commission on its recommendations, Bums 
worked to address those perceived issues. 
Burns went to extensive lengths to address traffic and safety. Burns' actions included (i) the 
purchase of two additional acres to improve the dedicated access already existing on the property, 
(ii) the submission of a detailed traffic study from a nationally recognized traffic engineer, (iii) 
reliance upon and utilization of a thorough traffic study commissioned by and paid for by Madison 
County itself, and (iv) Burns' agreement to pay for a left turn bay north of the North Interchange. 
The most thorough and important information submitted by Burns is entitled "Traffic 
Analysis-BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC-Salem Road, North of US 20 Interchange" (hereinafter, the 
"Traffic Analysi~") ,~~ which was submitted by Mr. James Pline, an expert in performing traffic 
analyses. As shown by his curriculum vitae,s4 Pline has an extensive educational and employnlent 
background in the traffic engineering field and is affiliated wit11 a nu~nber of professional 
organizations and technical organizations. Perhaps Mr. Pline's qualifications were best summarized 
by Planning and Zoning: "James [Pline is] anationally recognized professional traffic engineer with 
52 See Appendices A and B attached hereto. 
53 R. Exhibit 12 at Tab 3. 
54 R. Exhibit 12 at Tab 4. 
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over 30 years of e~perience."~~ In sum, Burns employed one of the best traffic engineers in the 
United States to analyze and address the concerns and issues raised by the Commission. 
Pline's Traffic Analysis not only contains his analysis of the proposed Burns site, hut it also 
incorporates and analyzes anumber of additional important studies, including the Dyer Group Study, 
the Madison County Transportation Plan performed by Keller Associates, and the Safety Analysis 
and Collision Summaries of the ITD for Salem Road at the North Rexburg Interchange. Each of 
these reports is briefly discussed below, followed by a thorough discussion of Pline's Traffic 
Analysis. 
(b) The Dyer Group Study. 
The Dyer Group Study was submitted by Winston R. Dyer, P.E., Manager of The Dyer 
Group, LLC, on December 3 1, 2003.56 The report was requested by Planning and Zoning to evaluate 
traffic impacts associated with the Burns facility as part of Mrs. Taylor's application. Mr. Dyer 
concluded that placement of the Burns facility at the proposed location was appropriate and did not 
present traffic and safety concerns. Mr. Dyer suggested that asingle approach to the Burns facility 
would he sufficient for the additional traffic coming to and from the facility. 
Concerning impacts on the Salem Highway, Mr. Dyer first stated that the site of Burns' 
proposed facility "provides excellent transportation access for serving the surrounding area."57 In 
order to preserve safety and operation of the Salem Highway, Mr. Dyer suggested that placement of 
55 R. Burns 15 at 9. 
56 R. Exhibit 12, Tab 3 at 13. 
57 id. 
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a stop sign at the Burns' access and construction of a left turn bay.58 Burns agreed to both 
suggestions and to pay for the construction of the left turn bay. 
Mr. Dyer also noted a perceived sight distance problem on the north side of the North 
Interchange and suggested that Buns  place the approach from its facility as far north of  the 
interchange as possible. Burns responded to this suggestion by purchasing two acres formerly owned 
by Bruce Shirley to accommodate Mr. Dyer's recommendation. The purchase of the former Shirley 
properly allowed Bums to redesign its site access, which permitted amore level entrance with better 
sight lines for traffic entering or exiting the Bums facility. 
(c) Madison County Transporlaion Plan (Keller Associates). 
The Madison County Transportation Plan (the "Transportation Plan") perfomled by Keller 
Associates, dated June 2004, was done with the sponsorship of Madison County, the City of 
Rexburg, and the City of Sugar City.59 The Transportation Plan was a comprehensive, expensive, 
detailed, recent, and well-conducted analysis of transportation as it currently exists in Madison 
County and what should be done for the next twenty years of anticipated growth. 
It is significant to note the following conclusious contained in the Transportation Plan 
pertaining to the North Interchange. In Figure 2.12, entitled "Roadway Deficiencies Map," neither 
the North Interchange nor the Salem Highway were identified as one of the ten roadway deficiency 
areas.60 Also, in Figure 4.5, entitled "Forecast Deficiencies-Existing Roadways and Intersections," 
58 Id.. 
59 R. Exhibit 10, Keller Associates, Madison County Transportation Plan, June 2004, at ES-1. 
60 id at ES-3, p. 2-31. For ease of reference, a copy of this figure is attached hereto as Appendix E. 
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both the north and south off-ramps at the North Interchange were classified as "sufficient," which 
is the best classification for a road in the Transportation Plan.61 
TheTransportation Plan characterized Salem Road south oftheNorth Interchange as amajor 
collector with existing level of service "D" and recommended additional traffic lanes in 10 to 15 
years.62 The Transportation Plan characterized Salem Road north of the interchange as a major 
collector with existing level of service "C" and reco~nnlended additional traffic lanes in 16 
to 20 years.63 Mr. Pline concluded that the Transportation Plan appeared to be "reasonable 
considering the projected traffic growth on Salem Road," and that "[tlhe relatively minor traffic 
generated by the Concrete Batch Plant in comparison to Salem Road volumes would have 
relatively no impact on these level of services calculations or the planned roadway impr~vements."~" 
(4 Safety Analysis of Salem Road at the North Rexburg Interchange (Iduho 
Transportation Department). 
The Safety Analysis of the Salem Road at the North  exb burg Interchange (the "Safety 
Analysis"), dated January 2004, was prepared by John W. Becker, District 6 Traffic Engineer for the 
ITD.65 The Safety Analysis was performed at the request of Planning and Zoning in conjunction 
with the prior application submitted by Mrs. Gayle Taylor 
61 Id, at ES-5, p. 4-15. The "sufficient" classification is the lowest classification used in the Transpottation Plan. The 
classification scheme used, in descending order of intersection deficiency forecast, is "critical," "significant," "moderate," and 
"sufficient." 
62 R. Exhibit 12, Tab 3 at *4. 
63 id ,  
64 id. 
65 R. Exhibit 5, John W. Becker, Safety Analysis of the Salem Road at the North Rexburg Inlerchange, January 2004; 
See also R. Burns 5 at 4, 8 (testimonj' of John Beckcr). 
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The analysis was conducted for the years 2000-2002 for the stretch of the Salem Highway 
between milepost 1.395 and 1 .750,66 which is essentially the stretch of road beginning just soutll of 
the south on and off ramps at the North Interchange and ending 686 feet north of the north onloff 
ramp terminal of the North Inter~hange.~' Milepost 1.750 is approximately 300 feet north of the 
proposed access to Bums' site, which means that the Safety Analysis included the stretch ofroad that 
Burns would utilize north of the North Interchange. 
The ITD found that four accidents occurred within the above stretch of road, two of which 
occurred at the intersection of the north ramp and two of which occurred at the south intersection of 
the south ramp.68 ITD found that three accidents occurred on the westbound off ramp, and one 
accident occurred on the eastbound off ramp. None of these accidents, however, happened north of 
the north ramp terminal inter~ection;~~ thus, there were no accidents reported on the stretch of road 
that would access the Bums facility. Based on these accident records, ITD performed a safety 
evaluation and found that this stretch was a "safe, typical roadway segment" when compared to 
accidents per million mile numbers." 
ITD also looked at traffic volumes, thc roadway itself, the interchange profile, sight distances, 
and whether traffic signals were warranted at the ramp intersections. ITD "determined there are no 
serious safety hazards or concerns at either of the ramp intersections with the Salem road."" ITD 
66 R. Exhibit 5 at i 
67 Id. 
68 I d ;  See also R. Exhibit 4, Idaho Transportation Depa~lment, Crashes by Year andseverity US 20 IC 337 (Salem 
IC) 2000-2003. 
69 R. Exhibit 5 at 1; See also R. Ex. 12 at *4. 
70 R. Exhibit 5 at 2. 
71 See R. Burns 8 at p. 17 LL. 19-25 through p. 21 LL.1-9 for the testimony of ITD representatives John Decker and 
Tom Cole; See also R. Bums I6 (ITD sight distance standards). 
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District Engineer Tom Cole testified that if the "Salem Highway were a State highway, the State 
would allow the proposed access at this location."7z Mr. Cole also noted that a similar interchange 
for Sunnyside Road in Idaho Falls, an interchange in the design phase at the time, was similarly 
situated and that the Sunnyside site was evaluated as a safe l~ca t ion?~  The only safety improvement 
suggested by the ITD for the North Interchange was that "[a] sign could be installed on the Salem 
road in advance of each intersection reading 'Trucks Entering Nig l l~ay . " '~~  
In a letter dated December 16, 2004, Matthew A. Davison, P.E., a District 6 ITD Traffic 
Engineer, stated that he had reviewed the Safety Analysis prepared by John Becker and concurred 
with its  finding^.^' Mr. Davison stated that "the State does not anticipate any safety issues at the 
interchange resulting from [Burns'] site plan de~elopment."~~ Mr. Davis011 also expressed 
appreciation for Burns' "willingness to hold [its] access point onto Salem Road as far north from the 
US-20 on-off ramps and [its] plans to provide for a dedicated left turn bay into [Burns'] site."77 
(e) Trafic Analysis, BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, Salem Road, North of US 20 
Interchange (James L. Pline, P.E.). 
Pline's Traffic Analysis not only contained his analysis of the proposed Burns site, but it also 
incorporated and analyzed the studies and reports discussed above. The Traffic Analysis specifically 
addressed the "public concerns and perceived problems with [the Burns' site] and the access 
72 R. Burns 7 at 5. 
73 R. Burns 8 at p. 20, LL. I 1 through p. 21 LL. 9. The Sunnyside Interchange has now been coiistructed and is fully 
operational. 
74 Id. 
75 R. Exhibit 12, Tab 5, Matthew A. Davison, Letter to Kirk Bunts, Deceinber 16,2004. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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location."78 Mr. Pline relied on information he received from the above studies and reports and on 
his own personal field review of the site made on November 19, 2004. In his analysis, Pline 
specifically addressed traffic volumes, sight distance, operational concerns, safety, and the Madison 
County Transportation Plan, all of which were raised during the hearings on Gayle Taylor's 
applications and raised again on Burns' applications. In regards to the traffic volume issue, Pline 
concluded that the increase in traffic volume from Burns' facility would be insignificant and would 
not have an effect on the level of service on the Salem Highway. Pline calculated the number of 
vehicles per hour that would be generated by the Burns facility and illustrated the generated truck 
traffic and distribution in the vicinity of the North Interchange in Figure 2 of his report.79 As shown 
in that report, the Bums facility would increase traffic by 1 10 vehicles per day traveling northbound 
in the road stretch located north of the north odoff ramps up to the Burns access road and by 110 
vehicles per day traveling southbound at that same stretch. This increase in traffic volume north of 
the north odoff ramps is "less than 5 percent of the total traffic north of the Interchange,"'' whic 
increase was determined to be insignificant and "would have 110 influence on the level of service." 
Pline also concluded that the sight distances relative to the access road to Bums' facility and 
the North Interchange are more than adequate to observe other vehicles in the vicinity of the North 
Interchange and the Salem Road and that a normal automobile on the Bums site access approach can 
see and be seen from the centerline of Highway 20 in the middle of the overpass, which is 
78 R. Exhibit 12, Tab 3, at * I  
79 id. at *7 (Figure 2). 
SO id at *7 (Figure 3). 
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approximately 822 feet." Pline further concluded that the "sight distances available are more than 
adequate to observe other vehicles in the vicinity of the Interchange and on Salem Road."82 This 
conclusion is supported by a review of the interchange design performed by ITD and the American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials ("AASHTO) Design  guideline^.^^ 
Pline also addressed operational concerns expressed by some residents with a proposed left 
turn bay that Burns agreed to construct, concluding that there would not be operational concerns with 
the Bums site and the left turn bay.84 
In Pline's study of the overall safety of the North Interchange, he also reviewed the Safety 
Analysis and Collision Summaries of the ITD, dated January 2004. He concluded that the stretch 
north of the North Interchange was safe because no accidents were reported at that intersection. The 
data from ITD showed that no accidents occurred north of the north oniofframps from 2000-2002. 
Mr. Pline also discussed a collision suinmary for the North Interchange, dated June 14, 2004, 
covering some of the same reported collisions, but also including collisions from 2003. The 
collision summary showed that fifteen collisions occurred, but that none of those collisions occurred 
north of the north oniofframps-meaning that none of the reported accidents occurred on the portion 
of the Salem Road north of the North Interchange adjacent to the Burns The ITD reports 
showed that all of the accidents occurred on the ramps surrounding the North In ter~hange.~~ 
81 fd at *2, V ((Figure 2). 
82 id. 
83 Id. 
84 id at $3. 
85 Id. at '4. The Collision Rcports arc found at R. Exhibit 4 
86 Id. 
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In the hearing relating to the Gayle Taylor application, some residents of the county claimed 
that many vehicles had been involved in traffic incidents north of the north onloff ramps. These 
claims were also renewed at the hearings on the Bums application. The data compiled by ITD does 
not support such claims. 
In accordance with the Evans case discussed above, the residents could have submitted 
information or documentation from the sheriffs office orpresentedoral or written testimony of those 
who may have been in accidents near the North Interchange to support their claims, if there was any 
factual basis for the claims. A lack of documentation or other evidence to support the residents' 
claims undermines the credibility of such claims and the credibility of the Commission's reliance 
on such claims. 
In regards to the comprehensive Transportation Plan (the Keller Report) prepared by the 
County, Pline concluded that the "relatively minor traffic generation by the Concrete Batch Plant . 
. . in comparison to the Salem Road volumes . . . would have . . . relatively no impact on [the] level 
of services calculations of the planned roadway improvements . . . ."87 
Based on the above extensive and thorough analysis, Pline concluded that the North 
Interchange was safe on every level. 
As discussed in the beginning of this brief, the County made a significant error in its first 
review of the transportation and safety issue, which caused the district court to remand the matter 
back to the Commission for additional review. Unfortunately, in its second round of analysis, the 
County again simply ignored Pline's Traffic Analysis summarized above and instead relied whole- 
87 Id. 
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heartedly on the oral testimony presented by local residents, even though it was not supported by ITD 
accident records, expert reports, engineering reports, or any other verifiable evidence. 
In its analysis of traffic and safety issues, the County admitted that the current studies by the 
State of Idaho demonstrate that the intersection is safe: "Current State traffic studies say the highway 
interchange located near the project site is safe and adequate to absorb the expected additional 
traffic."" Yet, despite these findings by the State, and without any expert or engineer opposing the 
State's findings, the County concluded: 
Access to the proposed project site is located in such close proximity to the 
interchange as to reasonably raise legitimate concerns as to the safety of such an 
access, especially where the usage of the access would be primarily dedicated to large 
cement trucks, delivery vehicles, employee vehicles, and hoped for heavy 
commercial traffi~. '~ 
There is no expert testimony or other reasonably reliable evidence supporting the above 
conclusion. Furthermore, the County did not explain why Pline's Traffic Analysis, the Keller 
Report, and ITD statistics were not relied upon in its decision, nor did the County explain why it 
relied only on the residents' unsubstantiated concerns, 
Furthermore, it appears that the Commission was intent to find ways to discredit Mr. Pline's 
expert testimony without actually addressing the substance of his testimony. Thus, Commissioner 
Muir characterized Mr. Pline's expert testimony in this manner: "I view that [Mr. Pline's testimony] 
as an emotional opinion, what he said, not a professional opinion."90 
88 R. Exhibit, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decision of the Board ofCounp Commissioners of 
Madison Counly, Idaho, RL: Comprehensive Plan Map Change to Amend a Properp Designation. From Agricultural to 
Commercial and Light Industrial Near the North Interchange with US Highway 20, June 1,2006, [hereinafter, "Second Written 
Commission Decision"], at 14. 
89 Id. 
90 R. Exhibit, Public Meeting, REBurn i [sicj Ifoldings. LLC, April 13, 2006, p.54, LL. 7-8. 
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In addition, without any supporting evidence from an engineer, Commissioner Muir made 
the following claim as to the road width at the North Interchange: 
He [Mr. Pline] talks about width of the roadway at that entrance. There is decent 
width, but the road width itself does not support turning lanes without restructuring 
the overpass. . . . I question the road width in that area. You could put a turning lane 
there, but then you'd compromise the shoulder width on that overpass stru~ture."~' 
This claim is not supported by any evidence in the record, nor was it mentioned in the 
Commission's first decision in this matter. Further, the Dyer Report, which Planning and Zoning 
commissioned, implicitly concluded that there is adequate room for a left turn lane, because Dyer 
specifically recommended construction of the left turn lane for the site access. 92 
In regards to sight distance, Commissioner Muir also made the following statement: 
He [Mr. Pline] mentioned the site [sic] distance. I drive over there about every day, 
but there's over 800 feet site distance from the south. I have to arguably decline to 
question that because you can sit on the off-ramp coming from the north and look 
towards the south and the closest thing you can see to the south is that you can barely 
see the top light at Artco. You can't view any of that traffic over the hill, so having 
800-foot vision, I question that highly."93 
The above statement misconstrued Mr. Pfine's testimony. Pline's testimony was that "a 
normal automobile on the site access approach can see and be seen from the centerline of US 
Highway 20 in the middle of the overpass structure or about 822 feet."94 Furthermore, Pline's 
testimony addressed sight distance to the north of the center of the North Interchange. 
Commissioner Muir argued that Mr. Pline's testimony pertained to sight distance from the north on- 
91 Id at p. 54, LL. 15-18, p. 62, LL. 16-19. 
92 R. Exhibit 12 at Tab 3. 
93 R. Exhjbir, Public Meeling. ILEBurn's [sic] Holdings, LLC, April 13, 2006, p.54, LL. 18-25 to p.55, LL. 1-2. 
94 R. Ex. 12 Tab 3, at * 2  (emphasis added); See also Figure B. 
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off ramps looking south on the North Interchange. Properly understood, Mr. PIine9s determination 
that there is a 822-foot sight distance from the center of theNorth Interchange to the Burns proposed 
access is completely accurate and supportable, unlike the Commission's claims. Indeed, the 822-foot 
sight distance exceeds ITD standards on this issue.95 
As if the above attempts by the Commission to discredit Mr. Pline were not egregious 
enough, the Commission again attempted to discredit Pline as to his testimony concerning farm 
vehicles. In Pline's video pre~entation?~ Pline concluded that there was more thanadequate sight 
distance to the Burns access based on a 55 mph speed limit for regular traffic. I-Iowever, as to slower 
moving farm vehicles, Mr. Pline noted that the sight distances may not be adequate, and proposed 
lowering the speed limit. In response, Comn~issioner Muir remarked: 
Another thing that's kind of offensive for me and the agricultural community, he says 
that you can't place the commercial vehicles in the same line as older farm trucks that 
maybe wouldn't get to speed adequately. There's two issues there. The farmers in 
our local comnunity have diesel trucks that will compare in horsepower to any 
commercial truck, and there's drivers in those farm trucks that are adequate for the 
road system for our agricultural community is insulting to me?7 
Mr. Pline was in no way "insulting" the local farmers. He was simply offering a safety 
suggestion for the County where slower moving farm vehicles are prevalent. Such advice from a 
nationally renowned expert, in normal circumstances, would be received with appreciation. This 
suggestion demonstrates that Pline's review of the project site was a true evaluation of the site, and 
not, as the Commission appears to suggest, paid-for biased testimony in favor of Bums. The 
95 R. Val. 4 Burns 16. The sight distance standard for a 50 mph spccd limit is 400-475 feet. 
96 R. Exhibit I. 
97 R. Exhibit, Public Meeting, REBurn'.s [sic] Holdings, LLC, April 13, 2006, at p.55, LL. 19-25 to p.56 LL. 1-3 
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Commission instead used Pline's suggestion as ammunition against Bums, further demonstrating 
the unfairness both Pline and Burns received from the Commission 
As to traffic and safety, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that the North Interchange is 
safe. The Commission failed to explain why it did not rely upon any of the above traffic reports, 
including Pline's, which demonstrates that the decision on this issue was results-oriented. 
(2) Inadequacy of the Design and Co'onstruction of the North Interchange. 
In aneffort to furtherjustify its factually unsupportable conclusion thattheNorthInterchange 
was unsafe, the Commission went so far as to conclude that the North Interchange design is 
inadequate, and likely is inadequate because, as the Commission speculated, budgets were strained 
when the North Interchange was built: 
A majority of the Board found that the interchange design is inadequate, due to sight 
limitations. While design standards may appear adequate on paper to the designer, 
actual practical use of the resulting design in reality often has a far different outcome. 
It is not unknown for projects to succeed on paper and fail in reality, or for lower 
standards to become much more acceptable when budgets become strained.98 
Not only is this conclusion unsupported by substantial evidence, it is not supported by any 
evidence at all, which is certainly a violation of the LLUPA. Indeed, Pline specifically noted that 
the interchange was constructed in compliance with State of Idaho policies.g9 Further, Planning and 
Zoning concluded that "the testimony from the two road engineers that the overpass was built to 
standard and would be safe could not be The Commission failed to articulate why its 
98 R. Exhibit, Second Written Com~nission Decision at 14. 
99 R. Exhibit I .  
100 R. Val. 4 Burtis 17 at 2 (Planning and Zoning Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law oil Comprehensive Plan 
Change); R. Vol. 4 Burns 22 at 2 (Planning and Zoning Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Zone Change). 
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findings were opposite o f  findings made by Planning and Zoning. Thus, it appears that the inclusion 
o f  this finding is further evidence o f  the results-oriented nature o f  the Commission's decision. 
(3) Property Rights. 
The Commission's decision relative to impact on property rights is arbitrary and capricious 
and not supported by substantial evidence on the record. In support o f  its decision to deny the Burns 
application, the Commission determined that the Bums proposal would have a negative impact on 
property rights, and based this determination on the testimony o f  two neighbors, one of which lived 
one-quarter mile away and the other of  which lived adjacent to the proposed Burns site across Salem 
Road.''' While these neighbors had fears that their property would suffer diminuition in property 
value, there was no evidence supporting their claims, which is contrary to the principle articulated 
in Evans. The need for specific supporting evidence is crucial in this instance because it is possible 
that the commercial and industrial facilities at the Bums site could actually increase property values. 
As noted by Commissioner Robison: 
Traditionally, i f  you've got an industrial [and] commercial site then you're actually 
worth more than like an agricultural piece o f  property or a residential piece o f  
property. Actually, the property values would go up, in my opinion. And what we're 
seeing in effect go up is i f  land use is changed from a residential to another type of  
use. 102 
The Commission did not properly consider the property rights issue. It relied on oral 
statements alone, without any supporting evidence. A decision based on such evidence does not 
meet the substantial evidence test. 
101 R. Exhibit, Second Writtn~ Commission Decision at 11. 
102 R. Exhibit, Public Meeting, RE Burn's [sic] Holdings, LLC, April 13,2006, p. 19, LL.15-22 
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(4) Compatible Uses. 
The Commission also determined that the proposed Bums facility was not compatible with 
other uses. In order to best address this issue and others to follow, we must first discuss the 
Commission's supposed standard when it uses the terminology of "incompatible uses" or 
"incompatibility" or "complimentary uses," because these terms were used frequently by the 
Con~mission. In explaining its standard, the Commission argued as follows in its briefing to the 
district court: 
For example, Bums never challenges the existing Comprehensive Plan goal of 
keeping complimentary uses together, yet, the Burns' proposal would insert two 
inconsistent uses in the middle of country now devoted to agriculture and residential, 
where there are no neighboring complimentary uses. In contrast, the Walter's project 
would be neighbored by several existing complimentary uses. 
* * * 
In order to keep "complimentary uses in tile same land use area," the County could 
only find as it did in both the Walters and Bums cases. In Burns, the neighboring 
uses are residential and agricultural. In Walters, the neighboring uses are 
commercial, industrial, residential and agricultural. The facts in the record 
amply justify the decisions made by the County.''' 
Bums is confused, to say the least, with the Commission's articulation of its standard as to 
cocnpatible or consistent uses. The Commission found with Walters that all land-use types 
(commercial, industrial, residential, and agricultural) are compatible; yet with Burns, the 
Commission argues that commercial and industrial are not compatible with residential and 
agricultural. This simply makes no sense. 
(5) Population. 
I03 R. Vol. 3 at 412, 416 (emphasis added). 
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Using the Bums-only complimentary use standard discussed in the above section, the 
Commission concluded that the Burns proposal would affect future housing and where population 
locates. The Commissionclaims, "[a] cement batch plant is generally incompatible and inconsistent 
with closely neighboring housing."'04 (To clarify, the proposed Burns facility is a concrete batch 
plant, not a cement plant). Further, the Commission references "closely neighboring housing," yet 
there are only two home on the same parcel that could be considered as bordering the Burns site. 
The remaining homes are over one-quarter mile away.'05 In addition, the Bums parcel is not 
presently zoned residential for housing. It is zoned as trans-ag 2 property, 
Conversely, with the Walters proposal, many homes line 4700 South along the southern 
boundary of the Walters site, which homes directly border the Walters site with a now-approved 
gravel pit. Further, as to sheer scale of potential residential sites, the Walters proposal has taken 130 
acres (over 250% the size of the Burns parcel) off the residential housing market. No mention of this 
is made in the Walters decision. 
Yet the County summarily determined there would be "no negative impact by the proposed 
[Walters] plan amendment on population."'06 As a result, two entirely different standards were 
demonstrably applied by the C~mmission.'~' 
104 Id at 12. 
105 See Appendices A arid B. The proximity of the Val Ball homc to the off ramp is closer than the Burns facility. 
106 R. Exhibit, Findings ofFacl and Conclusions of Law andDecision of the Board of County Commissioners of 
Madison County. Idaho, RE: Comprehensive Plan Zone Change to Add a Commercial and a Lighl Induslrial Zone Near Stale 
Highway 191, at 22. This is the written decision approving Walters' application. 
107 Additionally, as to Burns but not Walters, the Commission claims a population analysis includes a determination 
ofwhether residential homes could be located on the proposed parcel, and if so, the proposal "could affect where future housii~g, 
and thus population in this area locates." Such a consideration is not articulated in Idaho Code 8 67-6508. This statute states the 
population analysis is for an "analysis of past, present, and future trcnds in population including such characteristics as total 
population, age, sex, and income." Under the newly aiticulated ''potential future housing standard" inserted into the population 
analysis by the Commission, it seems that no future lion-residential development could happen in Madison County because such 
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(6) Housing. The arguments raised by the County on this issue are merely restatements of 
the arguments relative to the Commission's Burns-only "residential first" standard, as discussed 
above. 
(7) Land Use. 
The Commission claims that Burns would insert two inconsistent uses (commercial and 
industrial) into agricultural and residential land if it approved the Burns application.lo8 The claim 
that commercial and industrial properties are not complimentary is not supported by the record. Kim 
Leavitt testified that industrial zones imbedded in commercial property is well-accepted and used 
in land use planning.'09 Furthermore, the commercial and industrial combination was suggested to 
Burns by Planning and Zoning. There was no contrary testimony otherwise presented at the 
hearings. Furthermore, Walters' industrial and commercial application was approved in trans-ag 2 
zoned property which was adjacent to residential pr~perty."~ 
The Commission also claimed that the Burns proposal was rejected because the County was 
"preserving agriculture." But what is the County's standard for "preserving agriculture"? Based on 
the Walters decision, it is clearly not to prevent coinmercial and industrial development of 
agricultural ground because the Commission allowed these non-agricultural uses for the 130-acre 
Walters parcel. 
proposals would always take potential residential lalid offthe market. This conclusion is, to say the least, illogical. 
108 R. Exhibit, Second Written Commission Decision at 17. 
109 R. Exhibit, R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, RE: Burns Holdings, LLC Request for Comprehensive Plan 
Change, February 28, 2005, p.1 I, LL. 22-23. 
110 R. Vol. 4 Walters I .  
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Under the Commission's newly-articulated standard applied to Bums (but not Walters), any 
agricultural land located next to major highways such as Highway 20 would have to be considered 
for residential development before it could be considered for commercial or industrial use: 
If the Burns' property was poor farm ground, as they claimed, the objectives set by 
the Comprehensive Plan in support of the goal of preserving agriculture, called for 
having the ground first considered for residential development."' 
There is no support in the Comprehensive Plan for this rationale. There are no land preferences 
articulated in the Comprehensive Plan for what a landowner must consider first, second, and third 
when it comes to marginal agricultural ground. Further, this rationale is illogical in light of other 
provisions of its Comprehensive Plan: 
Commercial use in Madison County has traditionally been located along the state 
highways and in the Rexburg area, with the primary uses serving travelers through 
the area, serving the consumer needs of the residents, and serving agricultural needs. 
It is the desire of the citizens of Madison County to continue such uses along or 
within the area of the ltighway corridors, . . . 112 
This provision provides that the proximity of property to transportation corridors should factor into 
the Commission's decision. For exanlple, commercial use is encouraged on property located next 
to state highways. Thus, marginal agricultural ground located next to a major highway could and 
should be developed as commercial property under this provision of the Comprehensive Plan. It is 
arbitrary and capricious for the Comn~issioli to focus on one provision of the Colllprehelisive Plan 
111 R. Vol.3at415. 
1 12 R. Exhibit 18 at I6 (Madison Courily Comprehensive Plan) 
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to the exclusion of other applicable provisions. Yet, with its "residential first" standard as applied 
to Burns, it has done just that.'13 
Further, placement of residential subdivisions next to major interchanges is not consistent 
with what has historically been done in Madison County. Instead, the County has placed commercial 
and industrial facilities around the other existing interchanges in Madison County. Although the 
Commission argued to the district court that there is "no evidence in the record . . . that the other two 
highway interchanges in the County have commercial and industrial property located near them . . 
, ,"IL4 this argument is not accurate and is contrary to the record. Commissioner Muir acknowledged 
the historic practices of the County: 
Ifwe look at here down Main Street we have commercial areas developed off 
of that interchange definitely. If we look at the next interchange to the south, we 
have commercial areas around it and we have two industrial areas because we have 
potato plants that are complementing each other in that area. 
If we go further south to Thornton, we have industrial areas coming off of 
those interchanges with some c~mmercial."~ 
The Burns proposal is consistent with past County practices and the provisions of its 
Comprehensive Plan. A claim that the Comprehensive Plan supports placement of homes next to 
major interchanges is neither supportable nor logical. 
(8) Public Services, Facilities and Utilities. 
The Commission, as to Bums only, claims the following: 
113 As a related point, page 22 of Comprehensive Plan specifically calls for protection of "farm lo market toads.'' The 
Burns facility would meet that provision because of its close proximity to Highway 20. This raises a question as to how the ~. 
Count) coulil prot~.i[ Lrin-to-nthrkct roads if it encourages .lcvclilpli~eni ofresiJcltil:il arcas ncxr to hi:hud).; .in.l irlrzr;hrngt>. 
.A! . I<~  nrcc,\ailly iurses conrmerc~:+l and ii.lustriel uses funher ,).it Ii:ru th; Courtt) Scc I< l:xl~ihit 12, I'ab 2 .it 3 
114 R. Vol. 3 at415. 
I IS K. Exhibit, Public Meeting, R.5 Burn's [sic] Holdings. LLC, April 13, 2006, p. 37,LL.3-11 
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Since no public services such as water or sewer are available at the Bums' project 
site, and the project site is not in any area of city impact, the proposed Burns project 
site is inappropriate for the proposed zone change.'I6 
While it is true that Burns is not iocated within Rexburg's area of city impact, it is located 
adjacent to the City's impact area. Further, there have been discussions that either Rexburg or Sugar 
City will include the Burns site as part of their impact area in the near future given that growth 
surrounding the interchange is inevitable. 
Conversely, the Walters property is neither located within Rexburg's area of impact nor 
adjacent to the city's area of impact. It is also not located near any major interchange. Based on the 
Commission's rationale on this issue, the Walters proposal should likewise not have been allowed. 
The Commission's inconsistency on this issue further evidences the results-oriented motives of the 
County. 
(9) Community Design. 
The Commission argues that Burns is not located next to other industrial uses, and that this 
violates the Comprehensive Plan. This claim is not accurate, and ignores the location of the Burns 
site next to the Corneilsen gravel pit, which is located west of and adjacent to the Burns site (the 
County considers gravel pits to be industrial sites).'I7 Therefore, Burns is located next to apresently 
existing industrial use, and the County's claim to the contrary ignores this fact entirely. 
The Commission also states that the concrete batch plant would have a negative impact on 
community design, and specifically argues that it would negatively affect a"doorwayn into Madison 
116 R.Vol .3at419.  
117 See Appendicies A and B; See also footnote 5 above. 
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County. There is nothing in the Comprehensive Plan which addresses "doorways" and what 
tandards ought to be applied to such a consideration. Moreover, it has been established that the other 
doorways to the County-the other two major interchanges on Highway 20 in Madison County-also 
have industrial and commercial sites surrounding them. The nebulous "doorway" rationale i s  not 
a legitimate reason for denying the Burns application. 
(10) Implementation. 
The County's arguments relative to this issue are simply restatements of earlier arguments 
on industrial grouping, placement of industrial zones within areas of city impact, preservation of 
agriculture, and community design. Burns' response to these arguments are set forth above and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
D. A Substantial Right of Burns has been Violated Because Burns did not Receive a 
Decision Based on the Merits o f  Its Application. 
Judicial review is a two-step process, wherein "[tlhe party appealing the Board of 
Commissioners' decision must first show the Board of Commissioners erred in a manner specified 
under I.C. 5 67-5279(3), and second, that a substantial right has been prejudiced. One ofthe Idaho 
cases specifically discussing the substantial rights issue is Sanders Orchard v. Gem County. '18 
In the Sanders Orchard case, the Gem County Commissioners relied upon a purported fact 
to form the basis of their decision relative to a proposed subdivision. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme 
Court found that no written documents or oral testimony was submitted regarding the purported fact 
that the City of Emmett's central sewer and water lines would be extended to the subdivision in the 
I 18 Sanders Orchard v Gem County, 137 Idaho 695,52 P 3d 840 (2002) 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 42 
reasonably near future. The court held that the commission's findings were therefore not supported 
by substantial evidence and held that "substantial rights of Sanders Orchard have been prejudiced 
by the Board's action in basing its decision on an issue upon which no evidence was pre~ented.""~ 
Therefore, the court vacated the commission's decision. 
Similar to the Sanders Orchardcase, Burns has had substantial rights prejudiced because it 
has received an adverse results-oriented decision with no credible contraryevidence being presented 
in opposition to Bums' evidence. 
E. Burns Is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Pees Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-117 for 
the Fees Incurred in Challenging the County's Decision, Both for this Appeal and for 
the Actions Required to Be Taken Below in Challenging the County's Decisions. 
In its October 17, 2006 decision, the district court awarded attorney fees to Burns pursuant 
to Idaho Code 5 12- 12 I ,  but decided against awarding attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12- 
117. Burns has always been of the opinion that an award of fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-1 17 
was appropriate. However, rather than engage in an academic exercise over the basis for an award 
of attorney fees, Burns elected not to file a motion for reconsideration of the attorney's fees award 
when the district court made its award to Burns. 
The County filed a motion for reconsideration asking the court to reconsider the portion of 
the court's October 17, 2006 decision awarding attorney fees to Burns because the amount was 
excessive. In a surprise change of course, the court reversed its earlier decision on fees as to the 
basis for the award, which is not what the County had requested in its motion. 
119 Id. at 703, 52 P.3d at 847. 
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In arguing against the basis for an award of fees, the correct standard for making such an 
argument is set forth in the case of Burns v. B~ldwin.'~' The County had made no argument 
addressing those standards articulated in the above quotation. And without such an argument having 
been made, Burns was not on notice that the court might reconsider its award of fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code 5 12-1 2 1. This court should therefore reverse the district court's decision as to attorney 
fees. 
InFischer v. City ofKetchum, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the City of Ketchum "failed 
to properly grant a Conditional Use Permit" and in so doing, made a mistake that should never have 
been made.12' The court also stated that Idaho Code 5 12-1 17 "is not discretionary but provides that 
the court must award attorney fees where a state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in  fact 
or law in a proceeding involving a person who prevails in the action."'22 One of the purposes of 
Idaho Code 5 12-1 17 "is to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified 
financial burden attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have made." 
Burns has argued that just as in the Fischer case, the Colnmission in Burns' case made 
mistakes that never should have been made. In its October 17 decision, the district court determined 
that the Fischer case was factually distinguishable from the above-entitled case.123 Burns disagrees 
120 Burns v. Baldwin, 138 ldaho 480,486-87,65 P.3d 502,508-09 (2003): "To determine whether the award of 
attorney fees was an abuse of discretion, this Court applies the three-factor test f ~ o m S u n  Valley Shopping Cenfer: "(1) whether 
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Sun Valley Shopping Clr ,  Inc, v. Idaho Power Co., 1 19 Idaho 87,94,803 
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). The district court correctly perceived that it had discretion to decide attorney fees and acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistent with legal standards. Trial courts may award attorney fees under LC. g 12-121 if the 
case was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." I.R.C.P. 54(e) (1). 
121 Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 ldaho 349,355, 109 P.3d 1091,1097 (2005) (emphasis added). 
122 Id at 356, 109 P.3d at 1098. 
123 R. Vol. 3 at 505. 
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with the district court's conclusion that the County acted "under a basis of fact" in misinterpreting 
the traffic and safety issues presented to the County during the first round of consideration. It is 
quite clear from the County's written decision that the traffic and safety issue was the gravamen of 
the County's decision, and in arriving at this decision, the County relied heavily on discrediting the 
Pline Traffic Analysis provided by Burns, even with a second opportunity to properly review and 
understand it. The County made a mistake that never should have been made, and consequently, 
acted without a basis in fact. An award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-1 17 is thus 
warranted for fees incurred below, and for fees incurred in this appeal 
VT. COMCLUSIIBN 
For the reasons set forth above, this court should reverse the County's decision and allow for 
the comprehensive plan and zoning changes. In addition, Burns should receive an award of its 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 3 
Donald L. Harris, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, I-IAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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D E s C R I m O N  
WAS A TRAFFIC 
STUDY REQUESTED 





Both Bums and Walters applied for amendments to the comprehensive plan and zoning 
ordinance, to rezone agricultural or transitional agricultural property to a mix of light 
industrial and co~nmercial. As to the actual light industrial uses proposed, Bums proposed 
a concrete batch facility while Walters proposed locating a gravel pit at its site. 
Yes. Those reports include the Ptine 
Report, the Dyer Report, the report from 
the Idaho Transportation Department, the 
Keller Report, and the traffic count 
performed by Dusty Cureton. 
No. No traffic study on any traffic issue was 
submitted by Walters, or requested by the 
Commission. 
Yes. "Testimony received indicated that the 
existing roadways akeady see significant 
residential and industrial traffic, due t o  the 
existing industrial uses and residential 
ISSUE 







No. At the time of the Walten decision, the 
decision had not yet been made on the 
Thoniton Inter~hange.~ 
BUWS 
1 R. Exhibit, Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw and Decision qfthe Board ofcounty Commissioners ofMadison 
County, Idaho, RE Comprehensive Plan Map Change to Amend a Properly Designationfrom Agricultural to Commercial and 
Light Industrial Near the North Interchange ofU.S. Highway 20, June I, 2006, at 23 [hereinafter, "Second Written Commission 
Decision"]. This document is the subject of [lie Motion to Augment filed on November 29,2007. 
2 R. Exhibit, Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw and Decision ofthe Board of County Commissioners ofMadison 
County, Idaho, R&: Comprehensive Plaiz Zone Change to Adda Commercial anda Light Ii~duslrial Zone Near Slate Highway 
191, April 11, 2005, at 17-18 (This is the Waiters written decision, and is subject of the Motion to Augment filed on November 
29, 2007). 
3 Id. at 24. 
4 Id. 
WALTERS 
Yes. To address these issues, Bums 
prepared a comprehensive traffic report. 
Nevertheless, inresponse, theCommission 
concluded: 
"The north highway interchange near 
proposed project site has sight and other 
inadequacies which would he exacerbated 
by allowing a high volume access to exist 
in such close proximity as the proposed 
amendment requests' The 
becomes even worse where a substantial 
portion proposed new lraffic using the 
new access be laden cement 
and delivery vehicles, and where there is 
insufficient data to judge the impact of the 
proposed new commercial traffic."' 
neighbbrhoods existing in the area. The 
applicant indicated his desire to limit his truck 
traffic on county roads, hut needed flexibility 
in which roads to use, due to a 
lack of knowing where the state proposed 
highway overpass and interchange in the area 
will go in. The location of this interchange 
will impact what county roads a significant 
portion of the traffic in 
the area will use,,,2 
Nevertheless, the Comlnission concluded: 
"The site of the proposed amendme,,t has 
access to state highways and to railways, 
Existing limitations on coullty roads may he 
lessened upon the construction of a proposed 
llew overpass,interchange, Localroadways are 
already heginused by industrialand residential 
traffic in the neighborhood, and potential 
additional traffic posed by the proposed 
project would have minimal further impact on 
transnortation."' 
APPLICATIONS 
I BURNS WALTERS 1 
The ingress and egress was specified and 
planned for. The only access to the Burns 
site is an access designated and approved 
by the Idaho Transportatiol~ Department. 
The ingress and egress was not specified, 
required or planned for, yet the Walters 
application was approved. The following is 
testimony from Walters attorney on the issue: 
"Another issue is vehicle travel. We have 
already acknowledged and recognize that we 
would wish to, ifwe can, have the flexibility of 
course, but wish to go to the road, to the State 
road, just as easy and fast as possible. The 
interesting part of it depcnds on whose routes 
you're going Some people want to enter the 
State highway immediately west of the 
property, others want us to go south o f  the 
property because if that's the interchange they 
want to get us 011 the State highway faster than 
the County highway-well, 1 guess they're both 
State highways-in other words, the dual lane 
highway rather than the other one. . . . We 
don't know where the exchange is going to  be 
yet. We don't know what kind of constrai~~ts 
we're going to have. Obviously, you can 
appreciate that he needs to keep the flexibility 
there, . . . ."I 
"First of all, as to the issue of traveling d o w ~  
4700 . As we said in the Planning and Z o ~ ~ i n g  
and we say here. It is not the intent to go 
down 4700, especially past those homes. The 
only question here is an exit strategy, which is 
best. Until the off ramp is actually made, there 
is no way to know that . . .? 
"For the purpose of leaving the property, I 
guess that I didn't make il clear enough. Mr. 
Walters does fully intend, if he can, to exit by 
way of the State I-Iighway. Obviously, that 
still requires a permit from the State Highway. 
Until the State Highway actually makes a 
detennination as to whether or not thcre is 
going to be an exit from the dual lane highway, 
kind of puts us in a bad position."' 
5 R. Exhibit, Public Hearing RE Walter k Concrete Comprehensive Plan Change, February 28, 2005, at p. 10, LL 
21-25, to p.11, LL. 1-15 (This document is the subject of the Motion to Augment filed on November 29,2007). 
6 Id at p.45 LL.10-15. 
7 Id. at p.28 LI, 15-23. 
ISSUE 
AGREED T O  




Yes. Bums agreed to provide and pay for a 
left turn bay, and also purchased additional 
property to straighten out the site access. 
WALTERS 
No. Was not asked to pay for any 
infrastructure improvements, but when i t  was 
suggested by County residents, Walters 
objected to a suggestion to build a road 
though the middle of the site property. The 
local residents suggested this road so that both 
the Walters trucks and the trucks from 
Edstrom's gravel pit could use this road and 
avoid 4700 South. The Commission 
concluded that requiring construction o f  the 




APPLICANT BY TIIE 
COUNTY 
Yes Yes. 
8 R. Exhibit, Findings ofpact, Conclusions ofLaw andDecision ofthe Board oJCounty Commissio~ters ofMadison 
County, ldaho, XE Comprehensive Plan Zone Change to Adda Conrmercial and a Light Industrial Zone Hear State Highway 
191, April 1 I, 2005, at 18. 
9 See Exhibits A through C; See also R. Exhibit 12, Tab 2, p. 2-3. 
10 For some reason, there was contradictory testimony as to the exact acreage involved with the Walters parcel. The 
application stated that it invoivcd deveiopmerit of 119.6 acres. R. Vol. 4 Walters I .  Ilowever, Waltcrs laterstated lhal the parcel 
was approximately 13 1 acres. R. Exhibit Public Hearing RE: Walter's Concrete Comprehensive Plan Change, February 28, 
2005, at p. 12, LL. 20-25. 
QUALITY AND 
QUANTITY OF 
FARM GROUND TO 
BE DEVELOPED 
49 acres of poor farm ground due to the 
soil quality, shape, low spots, subwater, 
and configuratioll proble~ns because of 
Higl~way 20.9 
Over 130 acres of f a ~ m  ground that is bordered 
by other large tracts of farm ground. The 
acreage proposed by Walters is over 2 % times 
the size of the Bums parcel." 
TABLE PI. 
"It has become increasingly colnmon for 
residences to be located close to highways 




T o  HIGHWAYS 
"Although the property is bounded on one 
side by U.S. Highway 20, it is not 
uncommon for nice homes to border such 
highways. The property owlxed by Val 
Ball, located directly East of the project 
site across the Salem Highway, has a lovely 
home which faces the freeway. If the 
project site is in fact less desirable for 
agriculture, neighboring growth in the area 
has, and should continue to be toward 
residential developn~ent."'~ 
COMMISSION ANALYSIS 
"The project site has continued suitability 
for agriculture, and is also suitable for 
residential uses and commercial uses."" 
BURNS 
"Due to the physical characteristics of the site 
of the proposed zone change, the neighboring 
uses, and frontage of the property on State 
Highway 191, U.S. Highway 20 and the 
Eastern Idaho Railroad, the area has limited 
suitability for agricultural or residential uses. 
The best use of the property is that proposed 
by the applicant, con~mercial and industrial." 
WALTERS 
"The project site of the proposed 
amendment had a negative overall impact 
onhousi~~g basedon removing ground from 
tile housing market which, if no longer 
used for agriculture could and should be 
used for residential, and the proposed 
project's negative impact on neighboring 
residences."'" 
11 Second Written Commission Decision at 19. 
12 id. at 8-9. 
13 R. Exhibit, Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw andDecision ofthe Board of Counly Commissioners of Madison 
County, Idaho, RE: Comprehensive Plan Zone Change to Add a Commercial and a Lighl Industrial Zone Near State Highway 
191, April 11, 2005, at 22. 













LESENCE OF I considered and used as a basls for denying I Not discussed or considered 1 
BURNS 
Employed the following logic: 
1. The Bums' facility will "substantially 
increase traffic." 
2. The County "can not view even one 
accident as insignificant, where the safety 
of people are at stake." 
3. "It is reasonable to presume that an 
increase of traffic through the [North 
Interchange] will likely increase the 
number of accidents at the North 
Interchange." 
4. A large number of cement and deliveiy 
trucks using the North Interchange "only 
increases the hazard." 
5. "Even if the large number of cement 
trucks using the [North Interchange] does 
not increase the nuniber of accidents, they 
certainly increase the risk of accideiits 
being inore serious." 
6. All of the above "is, and should be 
significant to the County."" 
Yes, this was discussed in tlie Burns 
application: "There is substantial usage of 
the Salem Highway north of the 
interchange by those recreationists utilizing 
the Salem Highway to access the St. 
Anthony Sand Dunes, whichusage is likely 
to only increase with additional tourist 
oriented developments going into that 
area."IG 
The Comrnissio~i used this as a basis for 
dei~ying the Buins application. Mr. Pline 
did not analyze the potential comnercial 
traffic in his Traffic Analysis because at the 
time, the determination had not bee11 made 
as to the businesses that would locate there. 
I SPEEDING DRIVERS. I the Burns application. 
WALTERS 
Nodiscussionofperceivedincreasedpotential 
for accidents with @uck traWc. The logic 
applied to Burns by the County was not 
applied to Walters, even though heavy truck 
traffic was discussed at length at the Walters 
hearings. 
Not considered. 
No traffic study on any traffic issue was 
submitted by Walters, or requested by the 
Commission. Further, no traffic count was 
perfonned by Dusty Cureton. 
15 R. Voi. l at 166-67. 










17 R. Vol. 4. Burns 29 at 37-38. 
18 Id.at23. 
19 Second Written Comnissior~ Decision at 10. 
20 R. Exhibit, Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw and Decision of the Board of Counly Commissioners ofMadison 
County, Idaho, RE: Conzprehensive Plan Zone Change to Add a Comntercial and a Light Indusrrial Zone Near Stale Highway 
191, April i I, 2005, at 22-23. 
21 Second Written Commissiori Decision at I8 (italics added). 
22 R. Exhibit, Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law andDecision of the Board of County Commissioners of Madison 
County, Idaho, RE; Comprehensive Plan Zone Change to Adda Commercial and a Light Induslrial Zone Near State Highway 
191, April l 1,2005, at 25. 
BURNS 
"The primary purpose of the proposed 
amendment to the Comprehensive Plan is 
to further the economic interests of the 
owner of the land to be redesignated."" 
"[tlhe proposed plan amendment and 
resulting review is made primarily for the 
business and financial benefit of the 
proponents of the arnetidment, not 
necessarily tlie bettement~ftheCounty."'~ 
"[Tlhe primary recipient of benefits of the 
project would be  burn^."'^ 
" . , . the standards of beautification 
included in state and county Community 
Design standards would have to be either - 
substantially changes, orthe basicliotioliof 
beautification would have to be completely 
redefined. The changes to the 
Comprehensive Plan would be significant 
and would require a near coinplete 
rewriting of the Comprehensive Plan. No 
sufficient reason has beenshown to warrant 
such a d r a s t i c  change to  the 
Comprehensive Plan."2' 
WALTERS 
"The primary purpose of the proposed 
amendment to the Comprehensive Plan is to 
add an additional industrial zone in an area 
where such uses already exist, and to create a 
commercial corridor on state highways, as 
recommended by the Comprehensive Plan."20 
This above statement claims that an additional 
industrial use area will be added to the county. 
However, the County is not really adding new 
industrial ground. When the gravel pit is 
mined, the result will be a large pit filled with 
water, and no industrial businesses will be able 
to locate there. 
c~Implelnentation of the proposed plan 
amendment will be of only minimal impact, 
since it will require only an amendment to the 
Comprehensive Plan Map."" 
23 R. Vol. 4. Bums 29 at 25-26. 
24 R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, RE Burns Holdings, LLCRequestfor Comprehensive Plan Change, 
February 28,2005, at p. 99, LL. 23-25 to p. 100, I.L. 1-2. 
25 R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, m: Walter's Corzcrete Request for Zone Change, February 28, 2005, p.5 
LL. 12-17. 






TO AN INDUSTRIAL 
SITE IS 




USES NEXT TO 
E a c n O ~ r r ~ R  
POUND 
UNaccEPTABLE. 









Yes. The Commission stated that the 
realistic development of commercial 
property next toan industrial area would be 
"at best spec~lative."~~ 
After the close of the Taylor hearings, 
where the Comnission denied the Taylor 
application, the Commission suggested to 
the Plaintiffs and their counsel that 
commercial development would be 
appropriate at the Bums site. Also, the 
commercial buffer was suggested by Mr. 
Jeppeson of the Madison County P&Z. As 
stated by Kirk Burns: 
"During the original Planning and Zoning 
meeting, Jerry Jeppesen, who lllade the 
original request, or the original motion for 
approval for industrial ground, asked to 
change the front thee  or four acres near the 
Salem Road into commercial to act as a 
buffer for the overall size of the industrial 
property."24 
Yes. "Although the applicant's proposed 
industrial project is a modem and clean 
facility, the placement of an industrial 
cement batch plant at such a doorway, 
surrounded by comnlercial, agricultural and 
residential uses, is not aesthetically 
pleasing, but rather gives the impression of 
indecisive and unplanned growth, leading 
to incomnpatible and inconsistent usages 




No. The Commission never questioned 
whetherdevelopmentofthecommercial buffer 
next to the industrial Waiters site was 
speculative, 
As stated in tlle Waiters hearings by 
attorney, the commercial buffer idea was 
suggested by Jeppesou of the Madison 
County Planning and Zoning: 
"[The commercial buffer], [a]s amatter of fact, 
it was brought up by Mr. Jeppesen, who was 
on the Planlling and Zoning and used to be on 
the Commission, he felt like that was an 
important issue, that is why the change was 
made,,,2l 
Not considered or discussed, even tllough the 
Waiters site is commercial, 





COMMISSION ANALYSIS -- 
There are only two homes on the same 
property that border the Bums site. 
BURNS 
"The proposed site is in close proximity to 
s e v e r a l  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e s i d e n t i a l  
neighborhoods which would be negatively 
impacted by the proposed Plan change. In 
addition, current and appropriate 
residential trends in the area neighboring 
the project site would be drastically and 





"The proposed site is in close proximity to 
r e s iden t i a l  ne ighborhoods ,  w h i c h  
neighborhoods are also in close proximity to 
several existing industrial or commercial uses. 
There would be no negative impact by the 
proposed plan amendment on p o p u l a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
On the south side of 4700 South, there are 
many homes adjacent to the Walters site. 
"The proposed amendment to the 
comoreheusive olan to insert an island of 
induitrial zoning into the middle of 
residential and agricultural properties, 
could have a dramatic adverse impact on 
"The proposed amendment would have 





the property values of those whose 
property borders the project site."'" 
"While the proposed project would have a 
positive economic effect, as discussed 
herein, the primary recipient of benefits of 
the nroiect would he Burns."" 
"The proposed [concrete] batch plantby its 
nature does not specifically support the 
industry of agric~lture."~' 
"Economic Develop~neut would be positively 
impacted by the proposed amendment by the 
addition of jobs, tax base and providing local 
resources for existing busines~es ."~~ 
This issue was never discussed in the Walters 
decision. 
A gravel pit does support the production of 
concrete. Presumably, the Commission felt 
that Walters gravel pit will support the 
production of concrete at a batch plant, which 
will support agriculture. The Conunission did 
not conclude that Bums' concrete batch plant 
would suoport agriculture. 
27 Secoud Written Commission Decision at 22. 
28 R. Exhibit, Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law andDecision of the Board of County Commissioners ofMadison 
County, Idaho, X E  Comprehensive Plan Zone Change to Add a Commercial and a Light Industrial Zone Near Stale Highway 
191, April 11, 2005, at 23. 
29 Second Written Commission Decision at 21-22. 
30 R. Exhibit, Findings ofl'act, Conclusions ofLaw andDecision of the Board ofCounly Commissioners ofMadison 
Counry. Idaho, E: Comprehensive Plan Zone Change to Add a Commercial and a Light Industrial Zone Near Stale Ifighway 
191. April 1 I, 2005, at 23. 
3 1 Second Writtell Commission Decision at 10. 
32 R. Exhibit, Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw and Decision of the Boardof County Commissioners ofMadison 
County, Idaho, liE Comprehensive Plan Zone Change to Add a Commercial and a Liglrt Industrial Zone Near Slate Ifighway 
191. April 1 I, 2005, at 23-24. 
33 Second Written Commission Decision at 8. 
1 ISSUE / COMMISSION ANALYSIS I 
34 Id. at 17-18. 
SPOTZONING 
BURNS 
This issue was not raised in the 
Comnission's first decision, but is now 
argued by the Commission to be a reason it 
denied the Bums application?' 
WALTERS 
Not discussed or considered by the 
Commission. 
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